Thursday, May 8, 2014

April update

Just wanted to drop  line, let you all know what I've been doing. I'm working on a new analysis  but I did take some time this month to attend my first security/hacker conference, ShowMeCon 2014. I've posted a review over at EthicalHacker.net, its a forum where with good participation, you may be able to win yourself discounts, giveaways, or even completely free training, which is how I was able to attend this con. So definitely go take a look, sign up and be active.

https://www.ethicalhacker.net/forums/viewtopic.php?f=15&t=11878

Tuesday, April 8, 2014

New Analysis Apr 8 2014

Hi everyone. I'm trying to get into doing analysis regularly. So today I present another blog.

Today I did an analysis on a piece of malware filename 163842953.exe
MD5: 84e5e263ff859dae0df198c2b9051cf8 There is no clear consensus on what the Malware is on virustotal, and it has a horrendously low detection rate with the engines. (https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/da958d67485d4162f374fca97c3cfdd060aabb1ca49351efabdb5c4f414b2dd9/analysis/)

Here is a basic rundown on what I was able to find. When executed the file excuses cmd.exe silently and drops the following files:
File.exe: F2D365780E7DD0691C6FFB0EB888CABA
hhhii.exe: 53E9C0B26A983F00CD625BF2A1EB419B
mmmhhee.exe: 0EAAA93B405EC6B42121066646C56958

There is slightly better coverage for these files on the AV engines, excluding the last file which appears to have the job of performing reachback.

Speaking of which we saw a few URLs requested in this sample. IIRC, all requests were sent on port 80.
dupler-histu.com GET /b/shoe/456 HTTP/1.1
kozzi-acompany.com   GET /libk25.98/jquery/ multiple requests for this file.
GET /wpad.dat HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: System.Net.AutoWebProxyScriptEngine/2.0.50727.4927
mirutaruda.com  GET /startloader HTTP/1.1 GET /style.css HTTP/1.1 -  mmmhhee.exe is linked to this domain according to virustotal.
krowdclown.com GET /style.css HTTP/1.1  multiple requests for this file.

Now i'm no registry expert, so crawling through the entries was not easy, but I did notice these strange entries:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Cpvnutujyk
HKU\USER SID\Software\Cpvnutujyk - SID removed
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Cpvnutujyk\License: 0x000001C8

So thats what I got today, please leave feedback, thanks! EDIT: A comment on one of the reports links one of the domains to ASPROX, Unconfirmed, but certainly possible.

Friday, April 4, 2014

New analysis

Hey all,

I know its been a while since I posted, events events. After my first analysis I received a naughtygram form my ISP, actually just them letting me know that I might be infected! Well, I took some time and eventually found some new ways to do my analysis, hopefully with less risk. I do want to take a second to give a shout to TekDefense and their YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/user/TekDefense - some great videos there with introductions to Malware Analysis. So since this is my first real day back, i'll just review some info. Yesterday I was able to get my Security Onion (https://code.google.com/p/security-onion/)distro back up and running, and was able to test it out, so the goal is to do separate tests now, and perhaps at some point to integrate malware analysis and IDS testing, seeing what the IDS detects, and writing custom rules to detect what it misses.  So what did I see today from this version of cryptolocker? Probably not much that wouldn't be found in an in depth analysis paper written by an experienced analyst with hours to examine it, but I did notice a few things. The original file (Sorry, I don't have the name) spawned a new process, windtre.exe. windtre can be found in the user's temp directory and has an MD5 of 2BEDEF64E5A615619356219E44E5082D which was not in Virustotal. In the future I will be looking for ways to safely upload these files to sites for further analysis. Finally the malware did make some get requests for wpad.dat unfortunately I missed the ip's it requested. Future analysis reports will have this info, but i'll have to do it on days where I don't have to work! Well, thanks for reading guys, hope you all have a great day, please leave feedback. - SecTest

Sunday, February 16, 2014

Day 1 analysis

So my first forray into this world, I fired up my VM and wireshark and headed over to 2 websites I was told were hosting malware. Lessons learned 1: Make a checklist. I had forgotten to prep my tools and I ended up opening wireshark in the middle of my session, and forgot to take a clean snapshot of my vm.

Luckily or not the sites appeared to be clean. No google alert on the sites, no alarm from my security software and no redirects I was expecting. Lessons learned 2: stuff changes, sites get cleaned up.

So I headed over to google and looked up "list of infected websites" I came upon an old list and headed to one ending in .ru, a good candidate I figured. My host's security software did alert on the site and claimed it had denied access to the site, this was not completely the case as I was seeing the site, or at least a placeholder. IAC I reverted and looked for something more... active. Luckily a friend had mentioned in an online post that GRC hosted some malware. I headed over and found that it was hosting cryptolocker and zeus. I figured I am not prepared for cryptolocker and downloaded and ran zeus. Success!

This particular form of zeus came as a file, I believe a doc, likely a double file extension, i'll check later, and once executed brings up an adobe flash player installer/upgrade window, with a UAC window. Noticeable is that the program is signed by adobe, if I remember correctly the software uses legitimate but now revoked keys from adobe. If you give the software permission to install, it fails out and you are owned.

Analysis notes: Host security software blocked access to several IP addresses. When I threw a few of these through Virus Total, they came back clean or low detection rates, so Lessons learned3: don't rely completely on reputation and online scanners! I looked at my installed tools, regshot was the most useful with its comparison indicating that a number of files had been deleted and firewall rule changes made. Windows Defender was uninstalled, and the Windows firewall appeared to be turned off, though it was likely running in some fashion I suspect. Snort did detect the zeus activity and the exe file download. Strangely enough, OSSEC did not appear to detect any activity that I could see, so I have to suspect either its capabilities, or my use of ELSA as a monitoring tool. Please leave any thoughts or comments below, and thank you.

Setting up an analysis labratory.

This post is a quick rundown of the lab as it exists:

Host PC: PC with a large HDD, multi-core processor  and 12GB RAM.

VMWare Workstation

Guest OS:
Security Onion 12.4.3
Windows 7
Kali Linux

The Windows 7 PC is the host to be compromised and it is basically unsecured at this point, no updates, and running an outdated version of Java. It is running Windows Defender and Windows Firewall in their default states.

Installed Software:
regshot
wireshark
process explorer
process monitor
autoruns
fiddler proxy
ossec agent

As always, feel free to comment or contact me.

Introduction- First step into malware analysis

Hello,

I am SecTest, Security Analyst and starting now, very, very entry level malware analyst. I'm creating this blog to document my journey into this arena, hopefully you'll share with me as I fumble around in the dark, looking for bad things. Thank you for viewing and please feel free to comment, or contact me.